Abstract
Philosophers of disability generally divide themselves into two groups: mere-difference theorists, who contend that disabilities are not automatically or independently bad for their subjects, and bad-difference theorists, who contend that they are. In “The Minority Body,” Elizabeth Barnes advocates for a mere-difference view by arguing that all disabilities are neutral independently (‘neutral simpliciter’), and that empirical harms stemming from them are instead the result of an ableist society that is insufficiently committed to the accommodation of people with disabilities. In particular, Barnes responds to an argument posed by Jeff McMahan, who suggests that the bad-difference view is proved by the fact that disabilities are aggregately harmful—an individual afflicted with every conceivable disability seems to be harmed regardless of society’s efforts to accommodate them. Barnes counters that cumulative harm is not sufficient to demonstrate that each component is harmful, in the same way that a visually unappealing outfit may be composed entirely of articles of clothing which are themselves inoffensive. Although I believe that Barnes’s response to McMahan is successful, I argue that a revised version of McMahan’s argument survives Barnes’s objection and requires substantial revision to her argument. We need not conceive of this individual as being afflicted by every conceivable disability, but rather a single disability which entails all of these effects as symptoms. It appears that this hypothetical individual is (A) a person, (B) who is subject to a disability, (C) which harms them, (D) and these harms are not merely the result of an unaccommodating society—a set of premises which, if true, contradicts Barnes’s view. In this paper, I argue for each of these premises, explore and reject potential objections that a proponent of Barnes could make, and ultimately explore potential revisions to the Barnesian account which allow it to survive this line of argument. More broadly, this argument bears on the conception of disability used in psychological and medical contexts. By examining whether certain impairments could be intrinsically harmful even in ideal social conditions, this project connects the metaphysics of disability to questions in the biomedical classification of disability, and the role of empirical evidence in defining it.
Recommended Citation
Aron, Joseph I.
(2026)
"Maximal Disability & Mere Difference: An Objection to Barnes,"
Journal of the Alabama Academy of Sciences: Vol. 97:
No.
1, Article 52.
Available at:
https://jagworks.southalabama.edu/jaas/vol97/iss1/52
